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OF LIGNITE MINING AND THE RIGHTS OF
SURFACE OWNERS: A PEOPLE'S RESPONSE TO
THE ADVANTAGES OF TITLE CERTAINTY
Troy Farrell Odom*
I. INTRODUCTION
The term " 'minerals' has no definite and certain meaning that can be
attributed to it in all cases."' This is the edict of the Mississippi Supreme
Court in its sporadic discussions of near-surface mining. Though the Mis-
sissippi appellate courts have not applied that determination specifically to
lignite or other coals, I opine herein that phrase has no better application
than to those very substances.2
In their thoroughly researched article, Lignite Coal: A "Mineral"
Under Mississippi Law?,3 L. Michele McCain and Bernard H. Booth, IV,
admit the ambiguity of past legal determinations in Mississippi, but surmise
a "natural meaning" test should apply to adjudicating lignite as a mineral
pursuant to general reservations of "all minerals."4 Under this test, lignite,
since it is arguably accepted as a mineral based upon "ordinary and natu-
ral" principles, would pass as part of the mineral estate in general reserva-
tions of "all minerals."5 "Stability of title[, the authors opine,] is
paramount to the efficient exploitation of Mississippi's mineral resources."6
Their argument continues that any other method of determining the status
of lignite "is likely to lead to a fragmented and disjointed body of law and
stifle economic activity."7
That conclusion may contain merit to an unproven and uncertain ex-
tent; however, I assert fundamental principles of fairness, the right to have
ambiguous contractual provisions decided by the trier of fact, and general
* Troy is a partner with the Jackson, Mississippi, law firm Blair & Bondurant, P.A. Troy
graduated cum laude from the University of Mississippi School of Law in 2002. Troy is the co-author of
Drilling in the City: Local Police Powers v. State Oil and Gas Regulation: The Law Behind County and
Municipality Zoning Powers in the Tri-State Area, 52 LANDMAN 33 (Winter 2007) and Who Owns
the Hole?: Abandoned Wellbores Belong to the Mineral Owner, 55 LANDMAN 49 (Spring 2010).
Troy concentrates his practice on oil, gas, and other natural resource law, real property law, and wills
and estates.
1. Cole v. McDonald, 109 So. 2d 628, 635 (Miss. 1959) (quoting Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69
So. 2d 384, 386 (Miss. 1954)).
2. Discussed, infra, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi did
utilize that phrase concerning lignite while interpreting Mississippi law. See Black Stone Acquisitions
Partners I, L.P. v. Black, 2008 WL 3335895 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 6, 2008).
3. See L. Michele McCain & Bernard H. Booth, IV, Lignite Coal: A "Mineral" Under Missis-
sippi Law?, 28 Miss. C. L. REV. 255 (2009).
4. Id. at 275.
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property rights trump this illusory gain. The determination of whether lig-
nite is a "mineral" should be decided on a case-by-case basis, with the ulti-
mate determination left to the sound discretion of the finder of fact. In
other words, I profess the Mississippi Supreme Court is precisely correct in
its past holdings. The ultimate end of the law should be to do what is right
as it concerns all interested parties. What is economically expedient to the
owner of the mineral estate who came across his estate without any intent
at the time of the reservation to mine lignite, should not indiscriminately
outweigh the rights of land owners prejudiced by (surprise!) destruction of
the use and enjoyment of their estate.
II. THE LAW IN MISSISSIPPI
The reservation of the mineral estate must come in the form of an
instrument of conveyance, for example, a deed. In deciding whether a res-
ervation or conveyance in less than specific terms-for example, a reserva-
tion of "all minerals" or "oil, gas and other minerals"-includes specific
substances, it must first be determined whether that reservation is
ambiguous.8
Under Mississippi law, "if a contract or deed is ambiguous[j" then
"construction of those provisions involve[s] triable issues of fact." 9 In fact,
the interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a deed or contract has been
held to be "a vital fact issue."1 0 Thus, if an instrument's "construction de-
pends upon other and extrinsic facts in connection with what is written, the
question of interpretation should be submitted to the jury, under proper
instructions."n
A passage frequently cited by Mississippi appellate courts from Ameri-
can Jurisprudence states:
A deed which is ambiguous or uncertain may be definite
and certain by the practical construction of the parties to it -
while in interest. The construction put on such a deed by
8. This Article concerns only general reservations or conveyances of "minerals." An instru-
ment specifically conveying "lignite" and/or "coal" likely conveys the lignite estate with little or no
argument. Indeed, it would be close to impossible to argue the intent of the parties was otherwise.
However, land records of Mississippi are replete with reservations/conveyances of simply all or part of
the "minerals," period.
9. Hobgood v. Koch Pipeline SE, Inc., 769 So. 2d 838, 843 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Shelton
v. Am. Ins. Co., 507 So. 2d 894, 896 (Miss. 1987)); see also Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d
349, 354 (Miss. 1990) ("In summary judgment cases in which a contract or deed was deemed ambiguous
within its 'four corners' . . . ultimate disposition (i.e., construction of contractual provisions) generally
involves triable issues of fact . . . .").
10. Taylor Mach.Works, Inc. v. Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 635 So. 2d 1357, 1361 (Miss.
1994).
11. Baylot v. Habeeb, 147 So. 2d 490, 494 (Miss. 1962) (quoting 53 AM. JUR. Trial §§ 266, 267,
269); Hadad v. Booth, 82 So. 2d 639, 643 (Miss. 1955); Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Abernathy,
913 So. 2d 278, 283 (Miss. 2005). Federal cases interpreting Mississippi law similarly hold that ambigui-
ties in deeds present questions of fact. Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Miss. Res., Ltd., 154 F.3d 202, 207 (5th
Cir. 1998) (applying Mississippi law); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 457 (5th Cir.
2005) (applying same); Conagra, Inc. v. Country Skillet Catfish Co., 96 Fed. Appx. 171, 174 (5th Cir.
2004) (applying same).
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the parties is an indication of their intention. Therefore,
where the construction of a deed is doubtful, great weight is
to be given to the construction put upon it by the parties,
especially in the case of doubtful questions which must be
presumed to be within their knowledge, and such practical
interpretation of the parties themselves by their acts under a
deed is entitled to great, if not controlling, influence.1 2
As it presently stands, Mississippi case law concerning the application
of general reservations of "minerals" holds that term is ambiguous when
dealing with solid substances found near-surface. I quote again for empha-
sis the critical words of the Mississippi Supreme Court: "[T]he word 'miner-
als' has no definite and certain meaning that can be attributed to it in all
cases. "13
In fact, this author discovered no case in Mississippi involving the issue
of whether solid substances constituted a part of the mineral-as opposed
to the surface-estate, decided as a matter of law at the summary judgment
stage. In other words, each case entailed a trial on the merits, with full
consideration of all relevant, extrinsic facts.
In Moss v. Jourdan,4 the Mississippi Supreme Court held gravel to be
part of the mineral estate under a general reservation. Both parties
claimed title to the subject property through a warranty deed which con-
veyed unto J.C. Jourdan's predecessor the surface estate, and conveyed
unto D.T. Moss's predecessor "all minerals that may be on the above-de-
scribed land."" The court noted the surface of the subject property was
partially underlain with gravel and valuable only as pasture land.16 The
court further noted that the gravel could not be removed without destruc-
tion of that part of the surface underlain with gravel.'
The two issues presented to the court were: 1) who owns the gravel,
and 2) if the mineral estate owner owns it, does he have the right to remove
it.'8 The court summarily answered the first issue in favor of the mineral
estate owner.19 However, the court held Moss could not remove the gravel
12. 16 AM. JUR. § 174, at 536 (cited in Cummings v. Midstates Oil Corp., 9 So. 2d 648, 652 (Miss.
1942); Williams v. Chaney, 112 So. 2d 809, 812 (Miss. 1959); Singer v. Tatum, 171 So. 2d 134, 146 (Miss.
1965); Moore v. Kuljis, 207 So. 2d 604, 619 (Miss. 1967)).
13. Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69 So. 2d 384, 386 (Miss. 1954) (citing 1 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY 87; 1 A.L.R. 2d 787; 36 AM. JUR. Mines & Minerals § 31, at 302; 58 C.J.S. Mines & Minerals
§ 155, at 323). See also Singer, 171 So. 2d at 145 (quoting Witherspoon, 69 So. 2d at 386); Cole, 109 So.
2d at 635 (quoting same).
14. 92 So. 689 (Miss. 1922). The author apologizes for regurgitating case law previously analyzed
by McCain and Booth; however, this case law is absolutely necessary for the article and a complete
understanding of the precedential case law.
15. Moss, 92 So. at 689-90.
16. Id. at 690.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Rather than explicitly stating gravel is part of the mineral estate, the court relied on the
fact it was "manifest" from the plain language of the deed the grantor intended to convey all minerals.
Id. Further, there was no contention by either party that the merchantable gravel completely covered
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based upon the rule of law that "[a]n injury which tends to the destruction
of an estate, or which is of such a character as to work the destruction of
the property as it has been held and enjoyed, will be treated as irrepara-
ble." 2 0 The court found that removal of the gravel would cause irreparable
injury to the property.21 Thus, the court announced its holding: "[W]here
one person owns the surface of land and another the mineral therein, and
the mineral cannot be removed without destroying the surface, the owner
of the mineral, in absence of an agreement to the contrary, is without the
right to remove it."22
Thirty-two years later, in Witherspoon v. Campbell,23 the Mississippi
Supreme Court expressly overruled Moss v. Jourdan. In Witherspoon, the
parties presented to the court the same issue of gravel ownership. Camp-
bell conveyed the subject property unto Witherspoon reserving "all miner-
als now owned by me of every kind and nature, both liquid and
solid. . .. 2 4 The intent of the parties to the conveyance was for cultivation
of the land as a farm.2 5 Despite that fact, the grantor testified she specifi-
cally intended to reserve the sand and gravel when she drafted the instru-
ment of conveyance. 6 However, the grantor admitted gravel mining
would destroy the surface where conducted.2 7 Further testimony presented
from the county civil engineer determined the entirety of the subject prop-
erty was underlain with gravel, the gravel was approximately fifteen feet
deep, and removal of said gravel could only be accomplished through an
open pit after removing the overburden of soil. 28
Finding that "the word 'minerals' has no definite and certain meaning
that can be attributed to it in all cases," the court pursued an analysis akin
to a "contemplation of the parties" test: "[R]egard may be had not only of
the language of the deed, but also to the situation of the parties, the busi-
ness in which they were engaged[,] and the substance of the transaction." 29
The court noted several important facts: 1) the grantor herself was not
engaged in any type of industry wherein gravel would be useful; 2) excava-
tion of the gravel would greatly impair the use of the property as a farm; 3)
the entire property. Id. Therefore, the surface owner's contention that the mineral exception in the
deed was void due to frustration of purpose was without merit. Id
20. Id. at 690-91.
21. Id. at 691.
22. Id.
23. 69 So. 2d 384 (Miss. 1954). The express overruling is found on page 389 of the Witherspoon
opinion. However, the principle of law overruled was limited to post-Tinsley Oil Field reservations/
exceptions.
24. Witherspoon, 69 So. 2d at 385.
25. Id.
26. Id. The grantor further testified, though the court never expressly found, there were open pit
gravel mining operations on nearby lands at the time of the conveyance. Id.
27. Id-
28. Id. at 385-86. While not dispositive, it is also interesting to note that the owners of the
surface, not the mineral estate, initiated the excavation ot the gravel. Id. at 385.
29. Id. at 386, 388. The court cited both American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum for
this proposition. McCain and Booth refer to this in their article as the "surrounding circumstances"
test. McCain & Booth, supra note 3, at 269-73.
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oil had been discovered in the subject county five years prior and the cus-
tom in said county was to define "minerals" as oil, gas, and other like sub-
stances, as distinguished from gravel.3 0 The court further construed the
instrument most strongly against the grantor, an attorney, who prepared
the deed, and who could have specifically included "gravel" in the mineral
reservation.3 1
The court also cited several non-Mississippi cases concerning this is-
sue, all of which found sand or gravel to be outside the ordinary definition
of minerals when used in general reservations. 3 2 The court went to great
pains to discuss the issue of where the natural definition of sand and gravel
as a mineral fit in to its analysis:
While the word 'minerals' includes, in a technical sense, all
natural inorganic substances forming a part of the soil, the
term is used in so many senses, dependent upon the context,
that such a definition is obviously too broad, for it would
throw little, if any, light upon what was meant in a particular
case. So, to apply the word in the signification in which it is
employed in the scientific division of all matter into the
traditional three kingdoms, to a grant of land containing an
exception of the minerals, would be absurd, since all land
belongs to the mineral kingdom. . .
In the end, the court expressly found most parties to these types of
conveyances ordinarily have in mind oil, gas, and like minerals, not sand or
gravel.3 4 Those parties simply do not envision destruction of the entirety of
the surface, or significantly impairing the landowners use and enjoyment of
the surface through open pit mining, without more specific language in the
reservation. 35
We, therefore, think that it is clearly to the public interest,
and a matter of fairness to a great majority of the landown-
ers of this state and future purchasers of land, that if the
term 'minerals' is to include all of the gravel on the land the
conveyance should specifically so declare.3 6
30. Id. at 386.
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 9 So. 2d 228 (La. 1942); State ex rel Comm'rs
of Land Office v. Hendrix, 167 P.2d 43 (Okla. 1946); Winsett v. Watson, 206 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947); Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)).
33. Id. at 387 (quoting Psencik, 205 S.W.2d at 659). This insightful foreshadowing by the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court demonstrates the awkwardness of applying a "natural meaning" test across the
board. Unquestionably, lignite is composed of decaying trees and other vegetation, as is petroleum.
where is the dividing line?
34. Id. at 387-88.
35. Id. at 388.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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Moss v. Jourdan was, thus, overruled. However, in the interest of pro-
tecting antecedent contractual rights and expectations, the court limited its
ruling to those conveyances or reservations executed after "the changed
conditions brought about by the discovery of oil and gas in this state."
Shortly after Witherspoon, the Mississippi Supreme Court again honed
in on the intent of the parties to the subject conveyance in Cole v. McDon-
ald,38 though the outcome was different. In Cole, the court held it was the
intent of the parties to divide the property equally three ways, including the
valuable bentonite 39 located thereon.40
Cole concerned the dissolution of partnership assets.4 1 The partner-
ship had been engaged in the lumber business and owned considerable real
property interests in Monroe County, Mississippi.42 As part of the dissolu-
tion, the owners of the partnership executed several conveyances in 1928
that reserved "one-third (1/3) of the oil and gas or other minerals or the
proceeds therefrom, which may be found or produced from, under, and on
the above described lands." 43 The parties stated their intention as follows:
It is hereby intended to put the entire title to the above de-
scribed lands in said L. B. Cole, with an undivided one-third
(1/3) interest in the oil, gas and minerals thereon in said L.
B. Cole, a one-third (1/3) undivided interest in and to said
minerals in said F. A. Bradley, and a one-third (1/3) undi-
vided interest in and to said minerals in said Cleo McDon-
ald Young.44
Following said conveyances, L.B. Cole owned the surface estate and
sought to have confirmed in him title to the bentonite for mining purposes.
The record does not clarify how long after the subject conveyances that
L.B. Cole sought the confirmation of title, though it does appear to be close
to twenty-five years later.
After careful examination of the instruments of conveyance, the court
found "manifest" that "the reservations ... grew out of the relationship of
the parties as partners. It further seems manifest that the parties were un-
dertaking to vest in each the same mineral estate." 45 The court further
found that the parties did not contemplate limiting the mineral ownership
37. Id. at 389. Presumably those "changed conditions" began at the discovery of the Tinsley Oil
Field, Yazoo County, Mississippi, in 1939. See id. at 388 (specifically mentioning the Tinsley Oil Field
discovery when distinguishing the pre-Tinsley Moss case).
38. 109 So. 2d 628 (Miss. 1959).
39. Bentonite is a clay mined from the surface. In Cole, it ran from five feet, to more than twenty
feet below the surface. Cole, 109 So. 2d at 632. Commercial production, at least in the Cole case,
apparently could only be accomplished by strip mining. See id. at 636-37.
40. Id. at 636.
41. Id. at 628.
42. Id. at 629.
43. Id. at 630.
44. Id. at 631.
45. Id. at 636.
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solely to "oil, gas and other minerals of like kind and character." 6 The
court distinguished Witherspoon insofar as bentonite had previously been
discovered in marketable quantities in Monroe County prior to the reser-
vation of minerals.4 7 The court noted public interest in Monroe County
centered on a recent discovery of bentonite prior to the 1928
conveyances. 4 8
We think it could not be said, therefore, in reason that the
parties involved contemplated the reservation only of cer-
tain kinds of minerals, but that it was the manifest intention
of the parties that each should -be vested with an undivided
one-third interest in the oil, gas or other minerals of any
kind or character. 49
The court further noted the subject property was not completely un-
derlain with bentonite, but that it existed in separated areas in small pock-
ets.50 It noted strip mining the bentonite would not destroy the surface of
the lands for subsequent timber growth, which appeared to be the sole agri-
cultural use of the land.5 1
In the end, the contemplation of the parties controlled:
[I]t would be an unreasonable construction to place upon
the language of the conveyances. . . to say that the parties
intended that Cole was to retain a one-third interest in the
oil, gas and minerals of whatever kind or character, and that
the other two parties were to each retain a one-third interest
in the oil and gas and in minerals of only a certain kind and
character.5 2
Thus, bentonite, as it concerned the conveyances between the parties
in Cole, constituted a part of the mineral estate.5 3
The Mississippi Supreme Court took its most exhaustive look at this
issue in Singer v. Tatum.5 There, the court, in painful detail, applied the
46. Id. Experts testified for both sides during the Cole trial on the issue of whether bentonite
was, in fact, a mineral. Id. at 635. When all the facts and testimony were placed before him the trial
judge held bentonite to be a mineral, which the Mississippi Supreme Court found "controlling." Id.
Again, the court pointed to the ambiguity of the deed: "The most reasonable rule is that each case must
be decided upon the language of the grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances and the inten-
tion of the grantor if it can be ascertained." Id. (quoting 18 R.C.L., Mines, at 1094).
47. Id.
48. Id. The court noted several newspaper articles and publications from the State Geological
Department in this regard.
49. Id. at 636.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 636-37.
52. Id. at 634-35 (emphasis added).
53. See id. Using the contemplation of the parties test, the Court seemed to find most significant
the substance of the transaction, namely, equitable distribution of a third each of the partnership prop-
erty. Id.
54. 171 So. 2d 134 (Miss. 1965).
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"contemplation of the parties" test in determining whether salt constituted
a part of the reserved mineral estate under the following reservation: "The
Grantor herein Reserves unto itself, its agents or assigns, the oil, mineral,
gas, and petroleum, on, in, or beneath all the lands herein conveyed.a..0."
In Singer, W.S.F. Tatum obtained his interest in the subject property
pursuant to a warranty deed from Hibernia Bank & Trust Company, in
liquidation.5 6 As indicated above, the reservation did not explicitly list salt,
sulphur, or other hard minerals. However, approximately two and a half
years following the conveyance, Tatum sought to lease the subject property
for sulphur and salt production." This matter came to a head in 1962,
when Tatum's successors filed a bill in the chancery court for confirmation
of title to the salt, sulphur, and like minerals.58
The ambiguity of the subject conveyance was key to the court's rul-
ing." Thus, following the precedent of both Witherspoon and Cole, the
court delved into the circumstances surrounding the execution of the sub-
ject conveyance. 6 0 Included in this analysis were agreements and letters
executed by the parties contemporaneous with the subject conveyance. 6 1
The court also looked at pleadings and orders of the District Court of the
Parish of Orleans during Hibernia Bank's liquidation process. 62
The court also considered the Witherspoon and Cole cases at length
and found Cole to be more applicable in light of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances.6 3 Tatum had executed numerous documents contemporane-
ous with the subject conveyance, and even subsequent, which indicated his
belief salt and sulphur constituted a part of the mineral estate reserved.6
One such document was a mineral lease Tatum himself obtained from Hi-
bernia, wherein he agreed to pay Hibernia a royalty for sulphur produced
from the subject lands and "for any other minerals, other than oil, gas and
casinghead gas, produced or marketed by [Tatum] from [the] land." 6 5 Said
mineral lease further provided for notice to Hibernia in the event a mine
was excavated. 66 Another fact considered by the court was that both
sulphur and salt were mined extensively in the area around the site of the
55. Singer, 171 So. 2d at 137.
56. Id. at 135.
57. Id. at 140.
58. Id. at 135.
59. Id. at 141. "The deed could have been drawn and couched in other language which would
have eliminated the possibility of this contest . . . ." Id.
60. Id. at 138-40. The court noted repeatedly it looked at "all of the other evidence concerning
the surrounding circumstances and the situation of the parties which shed any light upon the intent and
understanding of the parties to the deed." Id. at 142.
61. Id.
62. Id at 140.
63. Id. at 142-46.
64. Id. at 138-40.
65. Id. at 140.
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conveyance-New Orleans-at the time of the initial reservation.6 There-
fore, the court held:
In conclusion and from all circumstances, evidence, plead-
ings and in conformance with the former decisions of this
Court, we hold that it is apparent that it was the intention of
the grantor, Hibernia, to reserve and it did reserve all of its
oil, gas, petroleum and other minerals under the subject
lands.68
Taking in the breadth of the Moss, Witherspoon, Cole, and Singer deci-
sions, it cannot be questioned that the Mississippi Supreme Court rigor-
ously applies a "contemplation of the parties" or "surrounding
circumstances" test when determining ambiguous ownership of near sur-
face substances. The court had several opportunities to declare hard-line
rules concerning specific substances, though it declined to do so based on
precedent. At no point in time did the court discuss the advantages of
declaring specific substances a part of the mineral estate. Rather, it de-
pended upon decades of precedent related to contract and deed interpreta-
tion. What was summarily dispatched through Moss is now equitably
considered to determine the true intent of the parties.
This is the same tack applied recently by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Mississippi when faced with the precise
issue of whether lignite constituted a part of the mineral estate under a
reservation of "all minerals."6 9 This case illustrates the precise reasoning
behind the theory of this Article.
III. THE BLACK CASE7 0
On one side, you had R.W. Black." R.W. Black was a farmer.72 He
was a poor, uneducated, father-of-three farmer who made his living grow-
ing crops and raising livestock on his farm in Choctaw County,
Mississippi.7
67. Id. at 144. It was also important enough to mention the salt was located approximately 1500
feet below the surface, and mining of said salt could be carried on without destruction of any substantial
part of the surface. Id.
68. Id. at 151.
69. See Black Stone Acquisitions Partners I, L.P. v. Black, 2008 WL 3335895 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 6,
2008).
70. By way of disclosure, the author of this Article represented the surface owners in this litiga-
tion; McCain and Booth represented the owner of the mineral estate.
71. Black, 2008 WL 3335895, at *1. Not all facts made their way into the written opinion. Many
of these facts are taken from deposition testimony or document production within the Black case.
72. Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Its Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, Black Stone Acquisitions Partners I, L.P. v. Black, 2008 WL 3335895 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 6,
2008) (No. 107cv9-D-D) [hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum].
73. Id.
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On the other side, you had the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans
("the Bank"). 4 The Bank was one of twelve lending institutions estab-
lished by the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 "to loan money to farmers at
low interest rates""-farmers like R.W. Black.
During the Great Depression, the Bank foreclosed on thousands of
farms.7 6 In 1932, during the darkest times of the Depression, the Bank
foreclosed on R.W. Black's 158 acre farm." The Bank bought the farm for
$250.00 at the foreclosure sale.78
As a general rule, the Bank maintained a strict policy concerning the
purchase of properties at foreclosure sales, namely:
[T]o sell acquired farms as quickly as possible at prices in
line with the market value at the time of sale. The purpose
being to place the farms in the hands of individual farm
owners at a price and on terms which offer the farmer rea-
sonable opportunity to pay the purchase price from the farm
income.79
On February 10, 1937, R.W. Black entered into a purchase-lease
agreement with the Bank, giving R.W. Black the right to purchase the farm
back for $721.00.so In connection with the potential sale, the Bank ap-
praised the "Normal Market Value of Farm" at $700.00.81 The Bank noted
R.W. Black's first payment was to be made when the crops were ready for
harvesting. 82 "Thus, the Bank wished R.W. Black a successful crop season
so that he could meet the terms of his agreement."8 3
In the Bank's March 8, 1937, Recommendation for Sale of Real Estate
Owned, it stated:
The property was acquired in June 1932 and reappraised in
1936 by W. B. Hirschliff, who gave it a normal market value
of $700.00 and a recovery value of $600.00. There is only
one three room tenant house and a small barn both needing
considerable repairs, no merchantable timber to speak of,
74. Black, 2008 WL 3335895, at *1.
75. U.S. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 301 (1972). If farmers wanted to do business with
the Bank, they had to organize into associations in which each member owned or could potentially own
a farm. Id.
76. See Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, Statement Regarding the Policy of the Federal Land
Bank of New Orleans with Respect to the Reservation of Minerals in Connection With Sales of Farms
Acquired Through Foreclosure at 1 (Nov. 1955) (on file with author). In Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana alone, the Bank foreclosed on 15,314 farms. Id. Over half of those were Mississippi farms.
Id.
77. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 73, at 2-3.
78. Id. at 3.
79. Black, 2008 WL 3335895, at *3 (emphasis added).
80. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 73, at 3.
81. Id. at 3-4. Therefore, it is important to note R.W. Black paid more than the fair market
value for the property.
82. Id. at 4.
83. Black, 2008 WL 3335895, at *3.
482 [VOL. 30:473
THE ADVANTAGES OF TITLE CERTAINTY
located on a dirt road, very small cultivable area. However,
this may be considered as a fair farm unit and with an aver-
age farmer could pay for the property and make a living
thereon.84
The Bank conveyed the property back to R.W. Black by Warranty
Deed dated December 23, 1937." The Bank drafted the conveyance and
executed it in New Orleans, Louisiana.86 Pursuant to its usual practice and
policy, the Bank reserved "[o]ne-half interest in all minerals."" There is
no mention of any specific mineral in the deed.8 8
At the time of the 1937 conveyance, the Bank stated its policy of re-
serving half of all minerals in its conveyances as follows:
The policy of selling only a portion of the mineral rights in
real estate was adopted by the bank with the definite objec-
tive of strengthening and maintaining the cooperative credit
system, in order to continue to serve those farmers with
loans and those who may need long term credit in the fu-
ture. . . . [I]t was early recognized that substantial losses
would be sustained by the Bank and the associations in dis-
posing of acquired farms. This was more than obvious in
view of the Bank's policy of selling farms at the then pre-
vailing market as soon after acquirement as possible. The
anticipation of these losses was the basic reason for estab-
lishment of the policy of reserving a portion of the minerals,
usually one-half, at the time farms were sold. It was thought
that should the minerals in later years prove valuable it
would afford the Bank and the associations an opportunity
to recover their losses.8 9
The Bank's own records reflect there was "some justification" to argu-
ments that its "perpetual reservation of minerals is unreasonable," and
thus, in 1939, the Bank changed its policy to limit its mineral reservations
to twenty-five years.90
84. Warranty Deed filed Oct. 2, 1943, Book 32, Page 552, Choctaw County, Mississippi Land
Records (Dec. 23, 1937) (on file with author).
85. See id.
86. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 73, at 5.
87. Warranty Deed, supra note 85, at 553.
88. Id. Prior to 1939, the Bank included virtually the same reservation language in its form deeds
throughout the state, regardless of the specific locale's geology. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note
73, at 5. Deeds from counties completely removed from Choctaw County, Mississippi, contain the exact
language. Id. For example, the Bank utilized the same reservation language in conveyances in Jeffer-
son Davis County, Mississippi. Id. at 5-6. Lignite has never been discovered in Jefferson Davis
County, Mississippi, even to the present date. Id. at 5.
By 1947, the Bank had acquired mineral interests in 9,194 tracts of land in Mississippi. Id. at 6.
This included 685,063 leased mineral acres. Id.
89. Policy Statement, supra note 76 and accompanying text.
90. Id.
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The Bank conducted an appraisal of the farm prior to closing.9' The
appraisal report states that the mineral condition of the farm was "not
known." 92 In a separate appraisal report obtained at the request of the
Bank, the appraiser noted there were no mineral leases on the farm, and
mineral exploitation would not injure its agricultural value.9 3
Prior to the December 23, 1937, conveyance to R.W. Black, there were
a few attempts to mine lignite in Choctaw County.9 4 Said mining attempts
were commercial failures, and the mines were shut down and abandoned
by 1936.95 "[C]ommercial exploitation of the lignite of Choctaw County
has been found to be impracticable[,]" proclaimed Franklin Earl Vestal of
the Mississippi State Geological Survey in 1943.96 Vestal further opined
that "few, if any, beds of lignite of workable thickness are likely to be
found in the Holly Springs formation of Choctaw County." 9 7 Meanwhile,
there was no evidence produced that lignite mining was occurring near
New Orleans in 1937 or before, where the form deed was executed.98
Meanwhile, by 1937, there was great interest abounding in Mississippi
and Louisiana's oil and gas. In the early 1920's, Dr. E.N. Lowe, the Direc-
tor of the State Geological Survey, seemed excited about the manifest in-
terest that geologists and oil development companies were expressing in
Mississippi's oil and gas resources. 99
Dr. Lowe again reported in 1928 that natural gas discoveries in nearby
Monroe County, Mississippi, had "definitely put Mississippi in the class of
states in producing territory, so far as concerns natural gas."' 00 Lowe fur-
ther stated that the "oil fraternity generally has manifested renewed and
augmented optimism in Mississippi as a probable future source of oil....
So largely have these developments directed attention to this state that the
Geological Survey is daily receiving inquiries as to these activities."' 0 '
91. Black, 2008 WL 3335895, at *3.
92. Id.
93. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 72, at 6.
94. See Franklin Earl Vestal, MSG Bulletin No. 52, Choctaw County Mineral Resources at 79
(1943) (on file with author).
95. Id. The mines failed because production of lignite was not commercially profitable. Id. Lig-
nite does not ship or store well due to its high water content. There must be a close-by plant to trans-
form the burning of lignite into an electric power source. The present day Red Hills Mine Power Plant
in Choctaw County is located at the actual site of mining. The technology to effectively mine the lignite
at the appropriate depths simply did not exist in 1937.
96. Id. at 82.
97. Id. at 86.
98. However, in Acadia Parish, Louisiana, near New Orleans, the Jennings Oil Field was discov-
ered in 1901. McFarlain v. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate, 43 So. 155, 156 (La. 1907). The prolific
Monroe Gas Field was discovered north of New Orleans in 1917. O'Neal v. S. Carbon Co., 43 So. 2d
230, 231 (La. 1949).
99. E. N. Lowe, Ninth Biennial Report for the Years 1921-23 of the Director of the State Geo-
logical Survey to the Mississippi Legislature at 13 (on file with author). Dr. Lowe detailed in his report
that sixty-two oil and gas wells had been drilled in Mississippi at that time. Id. at 54--58. At least
eighteen more wells had been drilled by 1928. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 73, at 8.
100. E. N. Lowe, Letter of Transmittal, in Ralph E. Grim, Mississippi State Geological Survey
Bulletin No. 21 (Jan. 25, 1928) (on file with author).
101. Id.
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As it concerned R.W. Black's piece of heaven, for forty years after the
conveyance, the Bank never took any action to indicate it had an interest in
exploiting its half mineral interest, with the exception of leasing the oil and
gas rights to Texaco, Inc., in May of 1953 and January of 1970.102 The Bank
didn't execute a coal lease covering its interest until January 11, 1979.103
Today, the Black's farm is mined for lignite.104 The farm is located
within the area known as the Red Hills Mine, a lignite reserve in Northwest
Choctaw County, Mississippi.'0 5 Lignite in this area outcrops from the sur-
face to depths of nearly 240 feet.106 The development of the mine began in
1998 after the Red Hills Power Project was implemented.107
Strip mining is the only economically feasible method to mine the lig-
nite.'0 8 Strip mining entails complete and total destruction of the lands
mined.' 0 9 The Black's farm is entirely underlain with lignite, and the entire
surface has been or likely will be destroyed during the mining process. 11 0
At present, the Red Hills Mine, and the destruction of the surface that goes
along with strip mining, is massive."' The mine is approximately a mile
and a half long and steadily grows." 2 Approximately twelve tons of soil
are removed for every ton of lignite produced. As much as 5,700 acres of
surface will be disturbed during the life of the mine. " Streams and creeks
have been rerouted, entire forests have been uprooted, sediment ponds
have been created, and houses and residents have been relocated." 4 The
Black's farm presently has a sediment pond and reclamation pond on it,
neither of which were there previously."'
As of September 2007, 1,949,877 tons of lignite had been mined from
the Black's farm acreage.116 That equates to 23,398,524 tons of soil."7
At the time the 1937 deed was executed unto R.W. Black, mining op-
erators had no obligation to reclaim property in Choctaw County.118 Rec-
lamation laws were not passed until 1979.119 In fact, the aforementioned
lignite mines that failed in the early 1930's were never reclaimed.120 Even
102. Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 72, at 9.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 9-10.
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today, it is estimated that it will be over fourteen years before a landowner
can return to the land; even then, it will never be the same. 12 1
By 2008, the grandchildren of R.W. Black succeeded to ownership of
the surface and the one-half mineral interest not reserved by the Bank.12 2
Black Stone Acquisitions Partners I, L.P. ("Black Stone") succeeded to the
one-half mineral interest reserved by the Bank. 2 3 In 2000, the leasing arm
of the operator of the Red Hills Mine, Mississippi Lignite Mining Company
("Mississippi Lignite"), obtained coal leases from both parties.124 Follow-
ing production, due to the unresolved issues of lignite ownership, Missis-
sippi Lignite held in suspense one-half of the net royalties due on
production from the Black's farm.12 5
On January 17, 2007, Black Stone instituted litigation against the Black
family, seeking to confirm and quiet title to one-half of the lignite.12 6 The
Black family counterclaimed for a declaratory judgment that they owned
100 percent of the lignite.' 2 7 Following considerable discovery, Black
Stone moved for summary judgment, arguing that the question of lignite
ownership constituted an issue of law. 128 The Black family defended, stat-
ing that the issue of lignite ownership was a question of fact for, in this
case, a jury to decide.129 The precise issue involved was whether the reser-
vation of "one-half of all minerals" in the 1937 deed included lignite. 30
Black Stone relied in part on the North Dakota case, Christman v.
Emineth.131 That case involved similar facts and issues. In 1940, the Fed-
eral Land Bank of St. Paul conveyed certain property in North Dakota,
reserving fifty percent of "any and all oil, gas and other minerals."13 2 In
1968, presumably after interest in mining the property arose, the surface
owner filed suit against the successors of the Federal Land Bank of St.
Paul's mineral interest, seeking to be adjudicated as the owner of 100 per-
cent of the lignite on and under the property subject to the litigation.13 3
Decided on summary judgment grounds, the trial court in Christman
held the word "mineral," as contained in the subject reservation, should be
construed in its "ordinary and popular" meaning and, therefore, included
lignite.' 3 4 On appeal, the surface owner attacked the trial court's decision
121. Id.








130. Id. at *1-2.
131. 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973).
132. Id. at 546.
133. Id. at 547.
134. Id. at 548. The trial court found this consistent with common usage and prevailing practice.
Id.
486 [VOL. 30:473
THE ADVANTAGES OF TITLE CERTAINTY
seeking the issue of lignite inclusion to be a question of fact.3 The Su-
preme Court of North Dakota upheld the trial court's ruling across the
board, citing numerous precedential cases in North Dakota involving
coal.136
Back to Black, the District Court for the Northern District of Missis-
sippi, declined to follow North Dakota's acceptance of the "natural mean-
ing" test, stating it was "not controlling on this court.""' The district court
further found several factual distinctions important between the two cases.
Primarily, Mississippi consistently holds that the issue of whether a sub-
stance is a mineral is a question of fact.'38 Further, the court found persua-
sive that both parties to the R.W. Black deed contemplated the subject
property to be used as a farm, inconsistent with an intent to strip mine
lignite.139
If R. W. Black's property was intended to be farm land by
all parties to the deed, that would seem to preclude the no-
tion that lignite, a strip-mined substance, was included in
the reservation of minerals. Both of these differences high-
light the impracticability of using the North Dakota case law
as more than persuasive authority. 40
Delving deeper into the specific facts, the district court found signifi-
cant the Bank's own policy concerning the reservation of minerals, namely,
the possibility of recovering its incurred losses.14' The court also focused
on the express understanding of the parties that R.W. Black was to use the
subject property for farming purposes in order to pay his note.14 2  Also
significant to the court's decision was Black Stone's proffered expert testi-
mony of Professor emeritus David Sansing of the University of Mississippi
135. Id. The surface owner secondarily argued lignite did not constitute a mineral as a matter of
law. Id. at 549. Obviously, he obtained no quarter from that argument.
136. Id. (citing Adams Cnty. v. Smith, 23 N.W.2d 873, 875 (N.D. 1946); Abbey v. State, 202
N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1972); Salzseider v. Brunsdale, 94 N.W.2d 502, 503 (N.D. 1959)). The supreme court
further looked to specific facts concerning the property, the conveyances in question, and the status of
the law. Id. at 550-51. The court found significant the fact the reservation included all rights of ingress
and egress, which, in and of itself, intimated the need to access the surface for mining operations. fd. at
550. "What means then would have been within the contemplation of the parties as reasonably neces-
sary to remove the lignite coal in question?" Id. The court further pointed to the fact coal mining had
been mined in North Dakota since 1884. Id. The court also found significant North Dakota's reclama-
tion act for strip mining gave certain protections to displaced land owners. Id. at 551. Coal mining was
an important and generally accepted practice in North Dakota.
137. Black, 2008 WL 3335895, at *2.
138. Id. The district court cited to Witherspoon, Cole, and the United States Supreme Court case,
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903). In Soderberg, the Court stated: "T]he word 'mineral'
is used in so many senses, dependent upon the context, that the ordinary definitions of the dictionary
throw but little light upon its signification in a given case." Soderberg, 188 U.S. at 530.
139. Black, 2008 WL 3335895, at *3.
140. Id. at *2.
141. Id. at *3. The Black Family argued this general policy proved the Bank did not specifically
intend to include lignite in the reservation.
142. Id. at *3-4.
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School of History, who provided considerable testimony of the circum-
stances surrounding the state of lignite mining in and around Choctaw
County prior to the 1937 deed.14 3
In summary, the district court held: "The parties have each presented
genuine issues of material fact as to what the parties' intentions were con-
cerning the phrase 'all minerals.' Accordingly, Black Stone's Motion for
Summary Judgment is denied."' 4 4
IV. CONCLUSION
There you have it. As McCain and Booth examined in their article,'14 5
the several jurisdictions each have taken different tactics in determining the
issue of lignite inclusion in general reservations of "minerals." States with
significant history or dependence on strip-mined substances, i.e., North Da-
kota, generally recognize that coal is included in reservations of "miner-
als".14 6 These states usually have comprehensive statutory laws protecting
the rights of both coal operators and land owners. Other states that do not
historically have significant lignite or coal mining operations, i.e., Texas,
flip-flop to the point of maddening confusion.' 47 However, Mississippi,
largely agricultural, and with diminutive history of large-scale strip mining,
seeks to protect the rights of unaware land owners by attempting to reach
the heart of the matter. Title certainty is advantageous for black and white
decision making for title attorneys, or their insurers. It is even more advan-
tageous for severed mineral owners removed from the path of surface de-
struction; but, it can hardly be a blessing to those working the land and
residing thereon.
I suggest that Mississippi actually gets it right. If it is the true intent of
the parties to a mineral conveyance or reservation to mine the subject
property for substances using the strip-mining method, simply insert "coal"
or "lignite" (or "sand," or "salt," or "gravel," or "bentonite," etc.) in the
essential language.148
A suggested alternative that would bring about the desired outcome of
title certainty is to create a rule of law holding a general conveyance or
143. Id. at *4. Professor Sansing's thorough research indicated heightened interest in coal mining
in the Choctaw County area prior to 1937, though, as the district court pointed out, commercial ex-
ploitation was admittedly impracticable. Id.
144. Id.
145. McCain & Booth, supra note 3, at 255.
146. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text; see also Abbey v. State, 202 N.W.2d 844
(N.D. 1972).
147. In Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975), the Texas appellate court deter-
mined surface destruction could not have been contemplated by the parties to the subject conveyance,
and, thus, held lignite to be a part of the surface estate. In Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980),
the Texas Supreme Court felt confident enough to establish near surface lignite, i.e., within 200 feet of
the surface as part of the surface estate. However, in Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.
1984). the Texas Supreme Court reverted, to an extent, by adopting a "natural meaning" test to hold
near surface uranium as a part of the mineral estate. The Moser court explicitly refused to overrule
Reed, though, in applying this test. Note this trilogy of cases was decided within a span of ten years.
148. As practical as that sounds, simple inclusion of the imperative words should foreclose any
attempt to thwart strip mining of those substances.
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reservation of simply "minerals" does not include surface mined minerals
unless the clear intent of the instrument of conveyance shows otherwise.14 9
Even applying that rule on a going-forward basis would help guarantee that
parties to these conveyances clearly set forth in the instrument their pre-
sent intention of ownership of surface or near-surface substances.
Short of that, the intent of the parties should be gathered from the
surrounding circumstances. While the Black case was terminated by the
parties outside of a trial on the merits, it is entirely possible the jury could
have found in favor of the mineral interest owner. This method, at least,
offers the surface owner peace of mind that his argument was decided after
all relevant facts were heard.
In their conclusion, McCain and Booth urged that " [s]tability of title is
paramount to the efficient exploitation of Mississippi's mineral re-
sources."15 0  I agree that stability of title is desirable, though not para-
mount to the true intent of the contracting parties. McCain and Booth
urge that the approach adopted by Mississippi-of granting the decision of
this issue to the fact finder-likely will lead to a "fragmented and dis-
jointed body of law."' 5 ' Maybe so, but the essential right to a trial on the
merits is a small price to pay in order to do what is right.
149. An analogous situation can be found in the Mississippi Supreme Court's application of the
Duhig Rule in conveyances of mineral estates. In Peavy-Moore Lumber Co. v. Duhig, 119 S.W.2d 688
(Tex. App. Ct. 1938), affirmed by Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940), the
grantor of the subject conveyance purported to reserve "an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in and to
all the mineral rights or minerals of whatever nature or whatever description in and on said land."
Duhig, 119 S.W.2d at 689. A one-half interest in the minerals had already been reserved by a prior
grantor in the chain. The Texas Court of Appeals held this language was ineffective to reserve the
remaining one-half minerals:
1st. The deed by its express terms purported to convey all the interest in the land except the
reserved one-half interest in the minerals....
2nd. If there is any ambiguity in the deed, it must be resolved in favor of [the grantee]. [The
grantor] owned a half-interest in the mineral rights; he purported to convey a half-interest in
the mineral rights [through the warranty clause of the subject conveyance]; it was necessary
that he reserve or 'retain' a half interest in the mineral rights to protect his warranty....
Id. The rule pronounced in Duhig is recognized in Mississippi by Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v.
Williams, 50 So. 2d 130, 134-35 (Miss. 1951), Rosenbaum v. McCaskey, 386 So. 2d 387, 389 (Miss. 1980),
and Wise v. Scott, 495 So. 2d 16, 18 (Miss. 1986), among others.
Applying Duhig to the present issue, it follows that, so long as an estate in lands is made by
warranty, all the interest in the lands, including such a dubious estate as lignite, is conveyed unto the
grantee unless expressly reserved or excepted.
150. McCain & Booth, supra note 3, at 275.
151. Id.

